Causal finitism claims nothing can have an infinite causal history. An influential defense of this position uses infinity paradoxes to argue that, if causal finitism is false, several impossible scenarios would be possible. In this paper, I defend that theists should not be persuaded by this argument. If true, this is an important development, since causal finitism is often argued for by theists as a core premise in Kalam-style cosmological arguments for theism. I extend the same analysis to an argument (...) in favor of temporal finitism and conclude that my point may generalize to any reasoning of a similar structure. (shrink)

Resumen: Analizo y critico las principales objeciones que Carlos Blanco plantea, en Las fronteras del pensamiento, contra las 5 vías de Tomás de Aquino. Mi objetivo es mostrar que dichas objeciones fallan, lo cual nos va a permitir traer, a la literatura en español, ciertas discusiones del mundo filosófico anglosajón. Palabras clave: 5 vías, Tomás de Aquino, Tomismo, Existencia de Dios, Filosofía de la religión Abstract: I analyze and critique Carlos Blanco’s main objections against Aquinas’s 5 ways, to be found (...) in his latest book, Las fronteras del pensamiento. My aim is to show how these objections miss the mark. This will allow us to bring into the Spanish literature some discussions that have taken place in the English-speaking world. Kewyords: 5 ways, Thomas Aquinas, Thomism, God’s existence, Philosophy of religion. (shrink)

We present and defend a Thomistic cosmological argument that runs independently of the principle of sufficient reason, sidestepping perhaps two of the most recurrent objections to cosmological reasoning: (a) the possibility of brute facts (i.e., that not everything needs an adequate explanation of its existence) and (b) the accusation of the composition fallacy. Drawing upon the work of Barry Miller, we show that any contingent entity like Thumper the rabbit, upon metaphysical analysis, is either a contradictory structure and therefore an (...) impossible existent or else points towards an extrinsic cause for the unity of its really distinct metaphysical parts (namely, its essence and its existence). This conclusion enables the inference that only an uncaused cause with no really distinct metaphysical parts can ultimately produce anything with really distinct metaphysical parts. We then suggest it is not implausible that this entity is God. (shrink)

Recently, in response to an article of mine, Joseph C. Schmid has argued that some traditional theistic arguments for God’s unicity are problematic in that they presuppose a controversial principle and conflict with Trinitarian theology. In this article, I answer Schmid’s concerns. I defend one of the original arguments while advancing new ones, and I vindicate my abductive argument for theism over naturalism.

I critically analyze Edward Feser's rendition of Aquinas's intellectus essentiae argument for the real distinction between essence and esse.

I argue that classical theism has a significant advantage as a theory of the First Cause over Graham Oppy’s naturalistic account. This is because classical theism not only gives us a clear answer to the question of how many first causes there are but also because it explains why there is that number and not another. In comparison, Oppy’s ‘initial physical state’ account seemingly leaves these questions hopelessly open, and so does his ‘metaphysical simples’ proposal for a foundational layer of (...) reality. I end by exploring two arguments from omnipotence and perfection that could be of use also to non-classical theists. (shrink)

Criticism and interpretation of Akhlāq-i Jalālī, a work of Muḥammad ibn Asʻad Dawwānī, 1426 or 7-1512 or 13, on Islamic ethics.

Rosso: Can you say something more about the differences between your work and Derrida’s?De Man: I’m not really the right person to ask where the difference is, because, as I feel in many respects close to Derrida, I don’t determine whether my work resembles or is different from of Derrida. My initial engagement with Derrida—which I think is typical and important for all that relationship which followed closely upon my first encounter with him in Baltimore at the colloquium on “The (...) Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man”—had not to do with Derrida nor with me, but with Rousseau. It happened that we were both working on Rousseau and basically on the same text, by sheer coincidence. It was in relation to Rousseau that I was anxious to define, to try to work out some … not discrepancies … but some change of emphasis between what Derrida does and what I’m doing. And there may be something in that difference between us that remained there, to the extent that in a very genuine sense—not as denegation or as false modesty —my starting point, as I think I already told you, is not philosophical but basically philological and for that reason didactical, text-oriented. Therefore I have a tendency to put upon texts an inherent authority, which is stronger, I think, than Derrida is willing to put on them. I assume, as a working hypothesis , that the text knows in an absolute way what it’s doing. I know this is not the case, but it is a necessary working hypothesis that Rousseau knows at any time what he is doing and as such there is no need to deconstruct Rousseau. In a complicated way, I would hold to that statement that “the text deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive” rather than being deconstructed by a philosophical intervention from the outside of the text. The difference is that Derrida’s text is so brilliant, so incisive, so strong that whatever happens in Derrida, it happens between him and his own text. He doesn’t need Rousseau, he doesn’t need anybody else; I do need them very badly because I never had an idea of my own, it was always through a text, through the critical examination of a text … I am a philologist and not a philosopher: I guess there is a difference there … I think that, on the other hand, it is of some interest to see how the two different approaches can occasionally coincide, at the point that Gasché in the two articles he as written on this topic says that Derrida and myself are the closest when I do not use his terminology, and the most remote when I use terms such as deconstruction: I agree with that entirely. But, again, I am not the one to decide on this particular matter and I don’t claim to be on that level … Stephano Rosso teaches English literature at the University of Verona and is writing a dissertation in comparative literature at SUNY—Binghamton. Among other works, he has coedited, with Naurizio Ferraris, Decostruzione tra filosofia e letteratura and Estetica e decostruzione. He is presently translating Paul de Man’s Resistance to Theory into Italian. (shrink)

Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this ‘critique of the inner rational agent’. (...) I argue that the critique does not support a wholesale shift away from the use of true preferences as an evaluative standard in normative economics; instead, the critique implies that behavioural welfare economists need to inquire into and establish the ‘source’ of particular context-dependent choices in individuals’ decision-making. The source determines the permissibility of correcting individuals’ context-dependent choices and can, in some situations, support decisive welfare judgements. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that selection history accounts of function can support a fully reductive naturalization of functional properties. I argue that this assumption is false. A problem with the alternative causal role account of function in this context is that it invokes the teleological notion of a goal in analysing real function. The selection history account, if it is to have reductive status, must not do the same. But attention to certain cases of selection history in biology, specifically those (...) involving meiotic drive, shows that selection historical explanations are available in the case of items without any plausible function. Making contributions to goals, here fitness, must be introduced as an additional constraint in the analysis, either explicitly, or implicitly by appeal to individual functions or the selection-of/selection-for distinction. (shrink)

Peter Geach's puzzle of intentional identity is to explain how the claim ‘Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's sow’ is compatible with there being no such witch. I clarify the puzzle and reduce it to the familiar problem of negative existentials. That problem is a paradox of representations that seem to include denials of commitment , to carry commitment to what they deny commitment to, and to be true. The best proposed (...) solutions can be understood through this paradox; I evaluate them, and defend a new solution. (shrink)

Descartes is well known as a mathematician and natural philosopher. However, none of Descartes's biographers has described the invitation he received in 1633 to fill a chair in theoretical medicine at the University of Bologna, or the fact that he was already sufficiently known and respected for his medical knowledge that the invitation came four years before his first publication. In this note I authenticate and contextualize this event, which I refer to as the ‘Bologna affair’. I transcribe the letter (...) written to the Bolognese Senate announcing efforts to bring Descartes to the university and explain the events that led to Descartes receiving the invitation. While many questions about the Bologna affair cannot be answered because of the paucity of the historical record, I conclude that the event invites us to consider again the larger historiographical issue of how best to integrate the history of medicine with the history of science and philosophy during the early modern period. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAssuming there are fictional objects, what sorts of properties do they have? Intuitively, most of their properties involve being represented—appearing in works of fiction, being depicted as clever, being portrayed by actors, being admired or feared, and so on. But several philosophers, including Saul Kripke, Peter van Inwagen, Kendall Walton, and Amie Thomasson, argue that even if there are fictional objects, they are not really represented in some or all of these cases. I reconstruct four kinds of arguments for this (...) unexpected conclusion; they concern the semantics of names, pragmatic force, creation, and representations’ qualitative content. But I find all the arguments flawed. I then argue for the contrary, employing a new perspective: representation of fictional objects begins with the works of fiction that originate them. A work of fiction represents its “native” objects because our culture bestows that property on it. I sketch conditions for such property bestowal and argue that they are satisfied in this case. (shrink)

In the past decade, several Descartes scholars have gone on record claiming that, for biological purposes, Descartes likely accepts the practical scientific necessity of the existence of “physical natures,” even while his official substance-mode ontology and his characterization of matter in terms of extension do not license the existence of physical natures. In this article, I elaborate on the historical context of Descartes’s biology, the “practical scientific necessity” just mentioned, and argue, contrary to other interpretations, that Descartes does offer a (...) philosophical justification for the existence of physical natures, albeit not by appeal to the categories of substance and mode, or matter as such, but by appeal to our “nature” as a union between mind and body. (shrink)

Abeill´e and Godard (1994) seek to show that the rightward branching analysis of French tense auxiliaries shown in (1b), that I argued for in Manning (1992) and which is widely adopted in general, is wrong, and that rather we should adopt a flat analysis for this construction as shown in (1c), and they show how such an analysis can be realized within HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1994).

Extensa exposición de la recepción del darwinismo en el Uruguay, que llega hasta la actualidad. Salvo en épocas más recientes, las reacciones, en favor o en contra, fueron de índole ideológica más que científica, especialmente a partir del concocimiento de The descent of man. Las polémicas entre católicos y 'evolucionistas' tienen, según el autor, su punto candente entre 1871-90. Le siguió un período de mayor apaciguamiento, en que la cuestión se consideró en función de los desarrollos de la ciencia biológica. (...) Es obligado poner esta contribución en relación con la obra de Thomas Glick, Darwin y el darwinismo: en el Uruguay y en América Latina (ver HLAS 56:5067)"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the claim that a corporation cannot be held to be morally responsible unless it is a person. First, I argue that this claim is ambigious. Person flags three different but related notions: metaphysical person, moral agent, moral person. I argue that, though one can make the claim that corporates are metaphysical persons, this claim is only marginally relevant to the question of corporate moral responsibility. The central question which must be answered in discussions of corporate (...) moral responsibility is whether corporations are moral agents or moral persons. I argue that, though we can make a case for saying corporations are moral agents, they are not moral persons, and hence, we can hold them responsible. In addition, we need not treat them the way we would be obligated to treat a moral person; we needn't have the same scruples about holding a corporation morally responsible as we would a moral person. (shrink)

The purpose of the following text is to give readers a general introduction to Gordon Pask’s conversation theory, which is considered here to be a cybernetic and epistemological account of concept-forming and concept-sharing through conversational discourse and practice. While Pask devoted three lengthy tomes to articulate the theory and its applications, I believe it is necessary to give readers who are interested in conversation theory a general introduction to what I believe are the key features of his work in this (...) area. I argue that conversation theory should be considered an inferential account of the theory of concepts rather than a representational account, by virtue of Pask’s argument that a concept must be a process that involves many other concepts. (shrink)

The individual motorist often defends his unwillingness to change his driving habits in the face of air pollution by pointing out that a change in his actions would be insignificant. The environmentalist responds by asking what would happen if everyone did change. In this paper I defend the environmentalist’s response. I argue that we can appeal to the following principle to defend both group and individual obligations to clean up air: if the consequences of everyone doing aare undesirable, then each (...) and every one ought to do was he can to prevent the undesirable consequences. (shrink)

Highlighting early modern medicine's program of explanation and intervention, I claim that there are two distinctive features of the physician's naturalism. These are, first, an explicit recognition that each patient had her own individual and highly particularized nature and, second, a self-conscious use of normative descriptions when characterizing a patient's nature as healthy (ordered) or unhealthy (disordered). I go on to maintain that in spite of the well documented Cartesian rejection of Aristotelian natures in favor of laws of nature, Descartes (...) and his most important medical disciple accepted both features of the physician's naturalism where human medicine was concerned. Thus, in this article I critically engage with standard portraits of Cartesianism and naturalism by integrating the histories of science, medicine and philosophy, but especially medicine and philosophy. (shrink)

Some scientists or philosophers argue that multiverse theories are unfalsifiable and thus not scientific. However, some advocates of multiverse theories have recently argued that although the multiverse is not observable, multiverse theories are indeed falsifiable in principle. Therefore, they share similar features with a conventional scientific theory. On the other hand, the proposals of an epistemic shift and nonempirical theory assessment have possibly revived the discussions of the scientific nature of multiverse theories. In this article, I revisit the falsifiable arguments (...) made by the advocates of multiverse theories and show that these arguments do not justify arguing the scientific nature of such theories. Moreover, even if we accept the proposals of the epistemic shift and the nonempirical theory assessment, I argue that multiverse theories still cannot pass or satisfy the required assessments based on the new theoretical virtues and the nonempirical arguments. (shrink)

In this paper I address Descartes’ use of analogy in physics. First, I introduce Descartes’ hypothetical reasoning, distinguishing between analogy and hypothesis. Second, I examine in detail Descartes’ use of analogy to both discover causes and add plausibility to his hypotheses—even though not always explicitly stated, Descartes’ practice assumes a unified view of the subject matter of physics as the extension of bodies in terms of their size, shape and the motion of their parts. Third, I present Descartes’ unique “philosophy (...) of analogy”, where the absence of analogy serves as a criterion for falsifying proposed explanations in physics. I conclude by defending Descartes’ philosophy of analogy by appeal to the value scientists assign to simplicity in their explanations. (shrink)

Every culture has its own taboos. Communication works better when the participants share more assumptions and knowledge about each other (Scollon & Scollon, 2000). However, in many cases, participants realize the existence of the rules associated with taboos only after they have violated them. Those who do not observe these social “rules” might face serious results, such as total embarrassment or, as Saville-Troike (1989) puts it, they may be accused of immorality and face social ostracism. This paper reports that certain (...) verbal and non-verbal taboos among Chinese people centuries ago still affect their language and behavior choices. Two types of Chinese possible taboos in language and behavior are introduced and compared with cultures of the Koreans and Americans: (1) gift-giving taboos which are phonologically linked to the “separation” and “death” in Chinese society, and (2) verbal expressions which are linked to the twelve zodiac-animals in Chinese traditional metaphors. This research paper also tries to answer two questions related to Asian culture and history: (1) whether Koreans share more of these phonologically-linked taboos than Americans do because Korean language has very similar sounds to Chinese; and (2) whether Koreans share with Chinese people more of the zodiac-animal-linked metaphors (i.e., the rat, the bull/cow, the tiger, the rabbit, the dragon, the snake, the horse, the sheep/lamb, the monkey, the chicken, the dog, and the pig) than Americans do because Korean people also use the same animals as a cycle of every twelve years. Data were collected in two ways: questionnaires and interviews. (shrink)

Under the influence of deleterious mutation and selection a population will reach equilibrium and contain individuals with [0, 1, 2 - - mutations.] This deterministic equilibrium distribution is exactly the same for asexual and sexual populations. The size of the optimal class , i.e. the class with the smallest number of mutations, is determined by the genome mutation rate and the average selective disadvantage of the mutations. A large U and small s gives a very small n o. If n (...) o is small in an asexual population it will be lost by drift and this causes a reduction in the mean fitness of the population . It is argued that diploidy increases U and reduces s. Values of U and s observed from Drosophila indicate a diploid would have a vanishingly small n o. The argument suggests Muller's ratchet is more powerful than previously accepted in asexual species derived from diploid sexual ancestors. (shrink)

This report details experimental results of using stochastic disambiguation models for parsing sentences from the Redwoods treebank (Oepen et al., 2002). The goals of this paper are two-fold: (i) to report accuracy results on the more highly ambiguous latest version of the treebank, as compared to already published results achieved by the same stochastic models on a previous version of the corpus, and (ii) to present some newly developed models using features from the HPSG signs, as well as the MRS (...) dependency graphs. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Rationalism and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction A priori Principles I: Davidson on Causation and the Mental Constitutive Principles and Classical Rationalism Classical Rationalism or Kantian Transcendentalism? The Refutation of (Transcendental) Idealism Rationalism Full‐Blown.

The topic of the present essay is the proper understanding of Donald Davidson’s version of the publicity requirement for the determinants of linguistic meaning. On the understanding I promote, the requirement is very strict indeed. My narrow aim is to show how such a strict conception of the publicity requirement can be maintained despite the evident need for interpreters to go beyond what is public on that conception in the process of constructing Davidsonian theories of meaning. Towards that aim, I (...) engage dialectically with treatments of Davidson’s principle of charity owing to Lepore and Ludwig and to Bar-On and Risjord, each of which, in different ways, recommend a more permissive approach to the publicity requirement than the one I recommended here. A broader aim is to shed some light on what would be required to take seriously the larger ambitions of Davidson’s semantic program. (shrink)

The complex philosophical theology of Paul Tillich, increasingly studied today, was influenced by thinkers as diverse as the Romantics and Existentialists, Hegel and Heidegger. A Lutheran pastor who served as a military chaplain in World War I, he was dismissed from his university post at Frankfurt when the Nazis came to power in 1933, and emigrated to the United States, where he continued his distinguished career. This authoritative Companion provides accessible accounts of the major themes of Tillich's diverse theological writings (...) and draws upon the very best of contemporary Tillich scholarship. Each chapter introduces and evaluates its topic and includes suggestions for further reading. The authors assess Tillich's place in the history of twentieth-century Christian thought as well as his significance for current constructive theology. Of interest to both students and researchers, this Companion reaffirms Tillich as a major figure in today's theological landscape. (shrink)

The life and work of Rousseau the musician and aesthetician has been largely neglected in the debate about Rousseau's views on women. In this paper, I shall introduce a new text and a new female figure into the conversation: Collette, the shepherdess in Le devin du village, an opera written by Rousseau in 1752. We see an ambiguity in Collette-the text often expresses one view while the music expresses another. When we take Collette's music seriously the following picture emerges: the (...) natural desire of women to be free, a fairly active female agency, an incipient rebellion against the social role of women, and a final acceptance of the role of wife. This view of Collette supports the thesis that for Rousseau women are not naturally subordinate to men but are taught to be subordinate because it is required for the maintenance of the patriarchal family, the cornerstone of civil society. We see many glimpses of Collette's true, unsocialized, nature, especially in the melodies she sings. It is in song, the first and hence most natural language of humans, that we see Collette's longing for freedom. But she ends by singing the praises of civil society, albeit a rural society, and thus implicitly accepting the subordination she is destined to suffer at Colin's hands. (shrink)

Traction forces developed by most cell types play a significant role in the spatial organisation of biological tissues. However, due to the complexity of cell-extracellular matrix interactions, these forces are quantitatively difficult to estimate without explicitly considering cell properties and extracellular mechanical matrix responses. Recent experimental devices elaborated for measuring cell traction on extracellular matrix use cell deposits on a piece of gel placed between one fixed and one moving holder. We formulate here a mathematical model describing the dynamic behaviour (...) of the cell-gel medium in such devices. This model is based on a mechanical force balance quantification of the gel visco-elastic response to the traction forces exerted by the diffusing cells. Thus, we theoretically analyzed and simulated the displacement of the free moving boundary of the system under various conditions for cells and gel concentrations. This modelis then used as the theoretical basis of an experimental device where endothelial cells are seeded on a rectangular biogel of fibrin cast between two floating holders, one fixed and the other linked to a force sensor. From a comparison of displacement of the gel moving boundary simulated by the model and the experimental data recorded from the moving holder displacement, the magnitude of the traction forces exerted by the endothelial cell on the fibrin gel was estimated for different experimental situations. Different analytical expressions for the cell traction term are proposed and the corresponding force quantifications are compared to the traction force measurements reported for various kind of cells with the use of similar or different experimental devices. (shrink)

The dynamical equations of quantum mechanics are rewritten in the form of dynamical equations for the measurable, positive marginal distribution of the shifted, rotated, and squeezed quadrature introduced in the so-called “symplectic tomography”. Then the possibility of a purely classical description of a quantum system as well as a reinterpretation of the quantum measurement theory is discussed and a comparison with the well-known quasi-probabilities approach is given. Furthermore, an analysis of the properties of this marginal distribution, which contains all the (...) quantum information, is performed in the framework of classical probability theory. Finally, examples of the harmonic oscillator's states dynamics are treated. (shrink)

In this paper, I assume that a satisfactory account of our thinking requires a conception of perceptual experience on which it provides reasons for judgment, and also that the Myth of the Given—the myth of episodes whose contents can provide reasons without the involve­ment of concepts—must be avoided. From these assumptions it follows that the content of perceptual experience must be conceived as concept-involving. The question I address is whether, given that it involves concepts, the content of perceptual experience is (...) best conceived as propositional, or as non-propositional. I focus my discussion around John McDowell’s shift from the former to the latter sort of view. After explicating his new, non-propositional view, I raise inconclusive doubts as to whether the contents of experience, on that view, can really function as reasons. I then address broadly phenomenological considerations, arguing that the appearance that the non-propositional view has the upper hand here is superficial, and that in fact, there are strong phenomenological grounds for preferring a propositional view. Though these considerations hardly settle the matter, they do place the propositional view in a comparatively favorable light. (shrink)

Care ethics can provide a valuable conceptual and normative resource for many issues in law, but given the conservative nature of law in general, much work needs to be done before care ethics can explicitly play such a role. In this paper I survey the landscape of law, discuss two attempts to incorporate care ethics into the normative framework of law, and suggest other avenues for incorporating care ethics in law and legal reasoning.

In this paper I will discuss a rather recondite phenomenon in the area of sequence of tense (SOT), exhibited by sentences like (1): (1) John said that Mary is pregnant. According to traditional grammar, this is a sentence where sequence of tense has failed to apply (i.e., concord has been broken): standard sequence of tense rules would dictate use of a past tense when embedding an event contemporaneous to the embedding verb under a past tense verb, giving the sentence John (...) said that Mary was pregnant. For some verbs breaking concord is impossible (*Mary said that John builds a house) or can only have a present-as-future interpretation (John said that the last spaceship to Mars leaves tomorrow), but with stative verbs, as En¸c (1987) and others have observed, this failure of sequence of tense to apply is associated with a rather special meaning, which we will try to elucidate below. For the moment, let us merely observe that the use of present tense seems to cause such sentences to end up saying something about a larger interval including both the time of utterance and the time of the event described in the main clause. For this reason En¸c calls them “double access sentences”, but that seems a rather dubious name as the interpretation seems to rely on evaluation at a large interval, not just at two points. (shrink)

In this paper I want to look at what the evidence from Complex Predicates can tell us about the design parameters of an empirically adequate theory of Universal Grammar (UG). This is a fertile field for investigation because, according to the standard assumptions of the field, complex predicates are monoclausal with respect to some properties and multiclausal with respect to others and this tension can only be resolved by giving up some cherished beliefs. After introducing the problem in Section 1, (...) Sections 2–4 will lay out the basis of the dilemma. Sections 2 and 3 argue that Romance complex predicates have an articulated rightwardbranching phrase structure, and cannot be analyzed as some sort of verb compound or verbal complex while conversely Section 4 shows how in many respects a complex predicate does behave just like a single predicate. Hence we require a notion of monoclausality that these complex predicates satisfy despite their articulated phrase structure. (shrink)

I wish to present a codi cation of syntactic approaches to dealing with ergative languages and argue for the correctness of one particular approach, which I will call the Inverse Grammatical Relations hypothesis.1 I presume familiarity with the term `ergativity', but, brie y, many languages have ergative case marking, such as Burushaski in (1), in contrast to the accusative case marking of Latin in (2). More generally, if we follow Dixon (1979) and use A to mark the agent-like argument of (...) a transitive verb, O to mark the patient-like argument of a transitive verb, and S to mark the single argument of an intransitive verb, then we can call ergative any subsystem of a language that groups S and O in contrast to A, as shown in (3). (shrink)

Roughly, behaviorist accounts of self-knowledge hold that first persons acquire knowledge of their own minds in just the same way other persons do: by means of behavioral evidence. One obvious problem for such accounts is that the fail to explain the great asymmetry between the authority of first person as opposed to other person attributions of thoughts and other mental states and events. Another is that the means of acquisition seems so different: other persons must infer my mental contents from (...) my behavior, whereas I need not. In this paper, I articulate a specifically Sellarsian behavioristic account of our knowledge of our own and others’ minds, and defend it against these two obvious objections. I further defend it against objections from Davidson, to the effect that Sellars’ account in particular cannot properly formulate the asymmetry at issue, and that behaviorism in general cannot account for the a priori character of the asymmetry. I argue that Davidson misinterprets Sellars at key points, and also misconstrues his own explanandum: What Sellars account can explain is an asymmetry in the reliability of first and other person attributions, but this asymmetry is not a priori. What is a priori is an asymmetry in the practice of according epistemic authority to such attributions. I argue that this asymmetry is what Davidson can and does explain, by appeal to the constitutive features of radical interpretation. But accepting this explanation does not require the rejection of Sellars’ account of the way that first and other persons in fact arrive at beliefs about their mental contents. The two approaches — one descriptive and empirical, the other constitutive and ideal — are compatible. (shrink)

I examine what would be necessary to move part-of-speech tagging performance from its current level of about 97.3% token accuracy (56% sentence accuracy) to close to 100% accuracy. I suggest that it must still be possible to greatly increase tagging performance and examine some useful improvements that have recently been made to the Stanford Part-of-Speech Tagger. However, an error analysis of some of the remaining errors suggests that there is limited further mileage to be had either from better machine learning (...) or better features in a discriminative sequence classifier. The prospects for further gains from semisupervised learning also seem quite limited. Rather, I suggest and begin to demonstrate that the largest opportunity for further progress comes from improving the taxonomic basis of the linguistic resources from which taggers are trained. That is, from improved descriptive linguistics. However, I conclude by suggesting that there are also limits to this process. The status of some words may not be able to be adequately captured by assigning them to one of a small number of categories. While conventions can be used in such cases to improve tagging consistency, they lack a strong linguistic basis. (shrink)

I examine the arguments Donald Davidson has offered through the years concerning the ontological bona fides of facts. In “Truth and Meaning”, Davidson uses the so-called “slingshot” argument to the effect that if true sentences refer, then they are all coreferential. Through a detailed examination of the assumptions underlying this argument, I show that, while it is effective as part of a reductio of bottom-up, reference based semantics, it has no tendency to establish the truth of its negative conclusion concerning (...) the existence of facts. Davidson also argues against facts by claiming they are of no help in the explication of truth. I claim that his repeated invocation of the slingshot in this context, as well as of arguments from other authors employing assumptions similar to the slingshot's, is inappropriate, especially in light of his own commitment to a top-down semantics — a committment inspired, ironically, by the reductio offered in “Truth and Meaning”. Davidson's other argument against truth as correspondence, namely that our grasp of facts is no better than our grasp of truths, is sound. But this argument does not show that there are no facts; it shows only that no theory of truth in terms of corre- pondence to facts can genuinely illuminate its explanandum. (shrink)

I defend and clarify my arguments in "Real Representation of Fictional Objects" in response to criticisms from Joseph Sartorelli. In particular, I clarify why Kripke's notion of "levels of language" and a pragmatic principle suggested by van Inwagen do not support the view that works of fiction generate fictional objects but do not represent them.